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Effect of Cost-Sharing Federal Programs on Adoption of Water Conservation Practices: 




The extent of recommended conservation practices is crucial for addressing natural resource 
concerns on the farms. The practices implementation is supported by working lands conservation 
programs, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program and the Conservation Stewardship 
Program. The paper applies a propensity score matching approach to evaluate the effects of 
enrollment in the two federal conservation programs on irrigation water conservation practices 
adoption in Louisiana row crop agriculture. The analysis reveals that enrollment in the programs 
leads to statistically significant greater adoption of water management practices. The analysis 
provides correction for selection bias in adoption that can result from not accounting for the 
differences between program participants and nonparticipants. The analysis enables to provide a 
stronger and relatively accurate argument about the impact of conservation support programs on 
the adoption of conservation on the ground. 
 






























Federal Conservation programs are a key policy issue in the ongoing debate in the United States 
Farm Bill. These programs provide billions of dollars to assist farmers in the adoption of 
conservation practices to mitigate resource use and enhance environmental benefits. These 
conservation programs focus on working-lands to assist in long-term conservation adoption to 
achieve improvements in water quantity and quality, wildlife habitat, and soil erosion (Horowitz 
and Just, 2013; Manale et al., 2018; van Benthem and Kerr, 2010; Zhang and Wang, 2011), 
among others. However, our understanding of the impacts of the government policies, 
specifically conservation programs, on the adoption of practices has been limited (Ahearn et al., 
2005). One of the reasons is that government programs often have different objectives and the 
programs are set to achieve those specific objectives, more so at the macro level (Key and 
Roberts, 2006), consequently affecting funding allocations for the programs. Although these 
programs have tremendously helped in inducing a positive change in conservation adoption on 
the ground, the debate over programs budgets is always up for discussion as national priorities 
change over time. 
As participation in any federal conservation programs is voluntary, program budgets limit the 
type of practices adopted and how long those practices are on the ground. Although the programs 
are introduced with anticipation that farmers would continue implementation of practices even 
without cost-share assistance, it is unclear how many of those practices continue without 
program funds, in which case, the environmental gain is relatively temporary. On the other hand, 
the complex process of conservation application can also deter some from applying for 
conservation dollars and might lead to implementation on their own, in which case 
environmental gain could be long-term. As a result, the decision to participate in a program relies 
not just on costs and benefits, often resulting in participation when the overall benefits exceed 
the costs of participation (Adusumilli et al., 2016), but also on the specific characteristics of the 
farm and the farmer (Adusumilli and Wang, 2018; Bautista et al., 2010; Caswell et al., 2001; 
Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). As a result, to evaluate the effect of farm programs for individual 
farmers requires identification of initial differences between participants and non-participants 
and the separation of the true effect of program participation.  
The current research applies the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach to evaluate the 
effect of conservation program participation for individual farmers in Louisiana. The matching 
approach has been widely used in various market policies including labor and agriculture 
(Heckman et al., 1999; Lynch et al., 2007), forest conservation (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012), air 
pollution control (Greenstone, 2004). Matching methods compare the outcome of program 
participants with those of matched non-participants where matches are chosen based on 
similarity in observed characteristics. Matching estimators’ pair treated individuals and untreated 
individuals who are similar in observable characteristics. Studies have found that cost-share 
funding programs have induced farmers to adopt conservation practices they would not without 
funding (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez, 2011). Similarly, conservation payments have resulted 
in a reduction in deforestation (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012); whereas, studies evaluating air 
pollution control found little evidence of clean air regulations role in attaining air quality 
(Greenstone, 2004). The current research follows previous studies to assess the effect of 




PSM has been used to estimate adoption patterns among individuals that are similar on a range of 
characteristics and make similar decisions about conservation adoption. A case study of Ohio 
farmers found that there is higher adoption, in other words, additionality, with respect to cover 
crops and tillage practices (Mezzatesta et al., 2013). Other studies found a similar level of 
additionality with buffer and soil conservation structures, whereas much higher additionality for 
nutrient management plans (Claassen et al., 2014). In this paper, we analyzed the effect of cost-
sharing federal programs and the pattern of irrigation water management practices adoption by 
row crop and pasture farmers in Louisiana, United States.1  
The analysis provides justification for conservation programs that often need evaluation for the 
overall cost vs benefits of their implementation. The analysis can shed light on the influence of 
programs on the adoption of conservation practices within given budgets to mitigate resource 
concerns. Such evaluation can allow for justification to program availability and budget 
allocations to meet some of the national goals pertinent to nonpoint source pollution, mitigate 
nutrient discharge to rivers and streams from working lands and consequently mitigate hypoxia 
zones in the Gulf. In the following sections, we explain the economic model, introduce the 
survey, and discuss the results and the implications. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Propensity Score Matching  
A simple comparison of mean outcomes may not reveal the actual treatment (program 
participation) effect since participants and non-participants usually differ even in the absence of 
treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In non-experimental studies, individuals self-select 
themselves into treatments groups. The treatment and control groups differ with respect to their 
participation in the conservation programs but also with respect to other characteristics. 
However, just calculating the difference in mean outcomes between the treatment and the control 
groups would yield biased results. Matching is a proposed method that can be used to estimate 
the average effect of a program. The method compares the outcome of participants with the 
matched non-participants, where individuals in these two groups are chosen based on selected 
observed characteristics (Heckman et al., 1999; Liu and Lynch, 2011). 
We mainly relied on methods based on a comparison of groups, i.e., comparison of farmers 
enrolled versus non-enrolled in federal conservation programs. Given the nonrandom nature of 
enrollment to these conservation programs, PSM controls for selection bias from observable 
                                                          
1 The members of technical committee from Louisiana Master Farmer Program (LMFP) identified 11 water 
management/efficiency BMPs. These water-related practices include: filter strips or buffers separating crop fields 
from drainage areas; filter strips around mixing facilities; grassed waterways; water-control structures; hold winter 
water on the fields; use side inlet irrigation in rice production; tail water recovery system; capture and use surface 
water for irrigation; use computer programs to improve furrow irrigation efficiency; prevent surface runoff from  




variables typically present in program evaluation studies that use the comparison of groups 
(Rejesus et al., 2011).  
We define an indicator variable D equal to one if a farmer enrolled in Conservation Stewardship 
Program (CSP) or Environmental Quality Incentive program (EQIP) program to fund the 
adoption of water BMPs, and D equals to zero if a farmer did not enroll. Further, we define the 
outcome variable Y1 and Y0 for each farmer. Let Y1 be the outcome conditional on enrollment (D 
= 1) and let Y0 be the outcome conditional on non-enrollment (D = 0).  
Since data on either Y1 or Y0 is observed not both for an individual farmer, matching methods 
construct a counterfactual, Y0, for the enrolled farmer using non-enrolled farmers that are similar 
in their observed characteristics X that affect the outcome Y0. The average impact of the 
conservation programs on conservation adoption, or the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), is the difference in the means of conservation adoption between those enrolled and their 
constructed counterfactuals. In the variable set, X, the factors that affect both the conservation 
adoption and the probability of participation, such as net farm income, years in farming, nature 
of production enterprise, and amount of farmland owned. 
The ATT is formally stated as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1] =  𝐸[𝑌1 | 𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸[𝑌0 | 𝐷 = 1] (1) 
 
The primary goal of the matching process is to obtain a counterfactual estimate of what enrolled 
farmers would do without cost-share programs. The PSM method provides a statistical 
comparison group that is based on a model of the probability of participating in the treatment, 
using observed characteristics (Khandker et al., 2009).  Participants, or in this case enrolled 
farmers, are then matched on the basis of this probability, or propensity score, to non-participants 
or non-enrolled farmers using logit model where enrollment in conservation programs serves as 
an endogenous variable. The estimated propensity scores are then used to construct the 
comparison group. 
 
By matching non-enrollees (non-participants) to enrollees with similar propensity scores, we 
conduct balancing tests to check if matched farmers are indeed the same on their observed 
characteristics. The estimated impacts are then calculated by taking the difference in the means 
of conservation adoption between the two matched groups.  
 
Following the usual practice in PSM (Khandker et al., 2009), ten nearest-neighbor matching was 
used to determine the matched samples. Selection of the matching methods depends on the 
distribution of the estimated propensity scores. Nearest neighbor matching pairs a non-enrolled 
farmer with an enrolled farmer whose propensity score is closest in absolute value (Dehajia and 
Wahba 2002). After matching, we check whether the two matched groups are the same on their 
observed characteristics. If unbalanced, the estimated ATT may not be solely the impact of 
enrollment. Finally, a standardized difference test, (i.e., a t-test) was applied for the equality of 




3. Data and definition of variables 
The study area is Louisiana, a southeastern state of the United States. We used the data from the 
Nutrient Management Survey conducted by the Louisiana Master Farmer Program. A stratified 
random sample organized farmers in the Louisiana Master Farmer Program database according 
to three major row crops (corn/maize, soybeans, and cotton) and/or pasture farmers, farms over 
350 acres in active production, and actively engaged in farming. The final group as a result of the 
above criteria consisted of 754 farmers from a total of 3,820. Of the 754, only 500 of them had 
contact information listed in the database. As a result, the survey questionnaire was sent to those 
500 farmers through email during December 2016 and January 2017. 
 
The survey was designed and implemented using the tailored design method for an online 
survey. The data collected contain information about farmer and farm characteristics, attitudes, 
current adoption of 11 water BMPs. The survey includes questions on socioeconomic factors, 
farm characteristics, production characteristics, whether each of the water management practice 
is adopted and on how much acreage. The federal programs included in the survey are the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), 
and Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). There was a total of 127 survey respondents. Usable 
responses varied by practice type depending on whether the farmer completed the survey for 
different practices; however, removing the undelivered and incomplete surveys, a total of 105 
responses were used in the analysis. The final response rate (21 percent) is above the 10% 
margin of sampling error (Dillman et al., 2009).  
Descriptive statistics of all the variables for the full sample (n = 105), enrolled (n = 55), and not-
enrolled (n = 50) are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable, ENROLLED, represents 
farmer’s participation in the CSP and the EQIP, two most popular federal conservation working-
lands programs. The variable is coded 1 if a farmer currently participates in CSP/EQIP and 0 
otherwise. Both programs currently support conservation implementation through cost-share 
assistance for each practice. The payments are fixed annual per-acre payments depending on the 
practice(s) being adopted. These fixed payments scan impact the overall net returns of farmers 
and can influence adoption (Adusumilli and Wang, 2018). 
The AGE variable in the survey is a categorical variable. For the analysis, it was coded 1 if a 
farmer was 40 years or younger and 0 otherwise. In Louisiana, the average age of a principal 
operator is 58.5 years (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2017), higher than the national 
average. Hence, there is more emphasis on the need for individuals to enter crop production 
enterprises to replace the aging farming population and keep agriculture and associated industries 
viable in the state. In addition, those entering farming at a much younger age than 40 years old, 
often seen in many family farms, do not necessarily make farm decisions because the older 
generation is still very much involved in farming. Those young individuals are only introduced 
into farming business to initiate the transition from one generation to another. As a result, the 
threshold of 40 years or older is picked based on expert local farmer advice. Similarly, 
FARMINGYEAR was coded 1 if the farmer operated his/her farm for more than or equal to 15 
years and 0 otherwise. The effect of length of time in the farming business is important because 
farmers often indicate a change in policies over time at the federal level that consequently impact 
funding to such conservation programs, ultimately their participation decisions. One of the 




introduced in the 2008 Farm bill replacing the Conservation Security Program. Thus, farmers 
who have more than 15 years of experience have seen both programs and might have changed 
their decision-making regarding participation.   
The effect of ownership, LAND_TENURE has been examined in a number of adoption studies 
(Abdulai et al., 2011; Oostendorp and Zaal, 2012; Paudel et al., 2008; Soule et al., 2000; Varble 
et al., 2016; Zeng et al., 2018) as ownership plays a crucial role in participation in federal 
conservation programs. It is one of the eligibility criteria to participate in conservation programs. 
In some instances, it may take several years to generate positive net returns by a conservation 
practice, which is likely to influence adoption if the land is rented (Henning and Cardona, 2000; 
Soule et al., 2000).  Thus, ownership of land or lease arrangements could strongly influence 
participation in a cost-share program and conservation adoption.  In addition, it is often argued 
that renters that have a short-term connection to land are less likely to implement conservation 
practices (Soule et al., 2000); however, it is not very clear about those tenant farmers that are in 
long-term contracts with landowners.  
The variable CROPACRES is a categorical variable. For the analysis, it was coded 1 if the 
number of acres farmed less than or equal to 500 acres during the most recent cropping year and 
0 otherwise. Farms that are between 200 to 500 acres constitute the majority of the farms in the 
southern United States, more specifically farms located in the Arkansas-Red River basin and the 
Lower Mississippi River basin (USDA-FRIS, 2014). Previous studies suggested that large-sized 
farms, greater than 250 acres, are generally more likely to adopt technology than smaller ones 
(Westra and Olson, 1997). 
For the purpose of this analysis, ATTITUDE was coded 1 if a farmer believed that farming 
practices affect water quality. Producers were asked about their perception of the relationship 
between conservation practices and water quality. Dummy variable attitude was included to 
capture producers’ awareness. The variable INCOME was coded 1 if the farmers’ annual gross 
revenue from farming is more than $500,000 and 0 otherwise. The average gross revenue of row 
crop farmers in the state is around $450,000 (authors calculations using total row crop acres and 
total sales of those crops in the state). Hence, the variable income was coded accordingly. Higher 
levels of income could imply fewer financial constraints and a greater ability to purchase 
technology, equipment, and materials, as well as financial flexibility to implement a new practice 
on the farm. The regional dummies, NORTH, CENTRAL, and SOUTH, are included to capture 
regional differences in natural resource concerns. In other words, resource concerns on farms are 
different among regions. Farmers would base their decisions on participation and adoption of 
practices on the conservation dollars available in these regions to address the resource concerns.  
The outcome variable, WATER_EP, is defined as a continuous variable, i.e., the number of 
practices adopted among the 11 practices identified as most recommended practices. The 







4. Results and Discussion 
We estimate our propensity scores using a logit model using the variables outlined in the 
previous section. Table 3 reports the estimation results for the logit model. Our results show that 
those who believe in the relationship that inefficient crop production practices negatively impact 
water quality are more likely to enroll in conservation programs. Farms with less than 500 acres 
of cropland are more likely to enroll. This result might be because farmers believe it is easy to 
maintain an additional field operation on fewer acres and/or the cost to implement an additional 
practice is much cheaper on smaller acres. However, it is important to note that, if enrolled, most 
of the times not all the acres in a farm have conservation practices but only some fields within 
that farm. One of the reasons is due to limited conservation dollars within that county/parish. 
Farmers in the north region are more likely to enroll. The northern part of the state is the 
dominant row crop area and is mostly irrigated. The need to improve irrigation efficiency is 
highest in that region. Hence, it is not unreasonable to see that those farmers are looking for cost-
share alternatives to implement practices to address irrigation related concerns.  
 
We predict the propensity score for each farmer using the estimated coefficients from the logit 
model. The application of the PSM requires that the covariates are balanced (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 1999), conditioned on the propensity score. The balancing test (Becker and Ichino, 
2002) divides farmers into strata based on equal intervals of the estimated propensity score. 
Within each interval, a test is conducted to assess whether there is no significant difference in 
means for each covariate between enrolled and non-enrolled farmers. Following the steps of 
PSM, the region of common support is between interval 0.2093 and 0.4500. Given that the 
balancing property is satisfied, and common support determined, the estimated propensity scores 
are used to conduct ten nearest-neighbor and kernel matching.  
Farmers’ enrolled in conservation programs significantly differ from non-participants with 
respect to number of water management practices adopted (Table 4). The results suggest that 
among farmers who enrolled in conservation programs would adopt at least two additional 
practices or a difference in adoption that ranged from 40 to 90 percent higher than those who did 
not enroll in the program. In other words, those enrolled implement higher amount of 
conservation and would provide greater benefit toward water quality management in neighboring 
bodies of water. On the other hand, conservation payments are fixed annual payments that are 
provided to the enrolled farmer for all the years as required by the program. As costs of 
implementation of practice(s) are incurred only during the first year, there is an additional 
payment that the farmer will receive for the next few years. As a result, it is highly likely that 
some motivation to adopt is driven by conservation payments. Our results support what 
Mezzatesta et al. (2013) found where conservation programs have led to increased adoption of 
conservation practices.  
The implication of this result is that addressing selection bias using PSM estimators have 
corrected for the overestimation that is observed when using an unmatched sample.  When 
programs are evaluated and are offered changes to the policy that allows farmers to move from 
non-enrolled group to enrolled group or vice-versa, the change in conservation adoption is much 
lower than what is seen in the unmatched sample. Moreover, when an improvement in the 
mitigation of natural resource concerns is of interest, the matching sample provides a better 




5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we use PSM to estimate the effects of participation in conservation programs, a key 
factor in evaluating the impact of a program. However, as the literature suggests, there are 
several challenges to conduct such an evaluation. One, farmers often self-select into program 
participation, as a result, enrolled farmers and non-enrolled farmers are significantly different in 
characteristics. In addition, response to policies will be not homogenous across farmers. To 
address these issues, a propensity score matching approach is used to evaluate the effect of farm 
programs. We specifically investigate the effect of enrollment in the EQIP and the CSP, the two 
largest working lands programs in the United States that cost-share on conservation practices, on 
conservation adoption behavior. The data were obtained through a farmer survey conducted in 
Louisiana.  
 
The analysis reveals the positive and significant treatment effects of the programs on water 
management practices adopted. The programs provide a per-acre payment for either one practice 
or in some cases a bundle of practices. These payments are intended to assist with upfront costs 
of practices implementation to mitigate resource concerns on the farm. The per acre payments 
could add to the overall net returns for some farmers. Thus, it seems to be a reasonable strategy 
to implement conservation to improve net returns and attain environmental gains, although not 
quantified here. 
 
Our results indicate that enrollment achieves positive and significant levels for the adoption of 
these practices, where, the increase is corrected for selection bias, which provides a better 
measure of conservation change compared to the unmatched sample. The policy insight from the 
analysis is that program enrollment is inducing management changes. The analysis also provides 
a better estimate of conservation implementation. The result is important because more acres are 
being farmed but with tight profit margins due to market forces and other exogenous factors. 
Despite such tight profit margins, farmers are willing to find ways to manage resource concerns 
that would provide natural resource conservation benefits. Funds allocated toward USDA 
conservation programs can provide the impetus and the necessary capital to practice better 
management methods and add to the goals of sustainable use of natural resources. Such a metric 
that can attribute the increase in adoption to conservation programs enrollment can provide 
policymakers the justification to support existing programs and/or evaluate consolidation of 
programs and help measure program effectiveness using better metrics.  
 
The analysis is based on a farmer survey. Using primary data has some advantages. One, 
conservation happens on the ground either through use of cost-share programs and/or at farmers 
own expense. In the case where own expenses are incurred to implement conservation, those 
practices are hardly recorded in NRCS contracts unless those same fields are used to implement 
conservation practices using cost-share programs. Hence, primary data collected through surveys 
can be useful to capture both kinds of individuals as the sample is randomly selected to conduct 
the survey, which then allows for a comparison of decision-making between these two groups of 




general, is undertaken without using the cost-share dollars. There are several arguments to this 
question, one, farmers willing to improve irrigation efficiency see this as a sure improvement to 
their net returns over long-term and are willing to bypass the program process to implement the 
practice(s). In addition, funds allocated to certain programs might be prone to tight competition, 
which would force some farmers to implement certain practices on their own. Nevertheless, the 
estimates conform to expectations that additionality is higher for practices that are considered 
priority resource concerns among farmers across the state. Natural Resources Conservation 
Service priority resource concerns evaluation for the most recent years has consistently ranked 
“inefficient use of irrigation water” as a priority resource concerns across the state. This is 
especially true with irrigation as irrigation expenses are the second most expensive item on crop 
production budgets (Deliberto et al., 2015). Our estimates indicate that current conservation 
payment programs are effective in securing the benefits of adoption.  
 
Conservation programs often provide the impetus to implement certain practices that are 
considered mostly irreversible. For example, certain irrigation practices require land-leveling, a 
relatively expensive production practice that improves irrigation water flow in the fields. 
Farmers are willing to invest in such prerequisites if they can take advantage of cost-share 
programs that can enable improving irrigation efficiency, consequently reducing the risk of yield 
loss from low ground moisture conditions due to prolonged dry weather. Hence, the conservation 
programs can act as a driving factor to implement practices that improve conservation practice 
performance, consequently overall environmental gain from mitigation of resource use, an 
economic impact often not accounted. However, it can also be the case that availability of 
conservation payments could lead to farmers bringing marginal lands into production as the 
availability of conservation dollars makes the returns from such lands net positive, implication 
termed as slippage (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez, 2011). 
 
One of the limitations of the analysis is that, in the survey, information is collected on irrigation 
practices implemented on the farm and participation in working-lands conservation programs. 
Some of the practices cost-shared through the conservation program require some prerequisite 
practices. For example, cost-sharing on a tailwater system in a furrow irrigation production 
system would require farmers to first utilize computer programs such as pipe-planner to 
determine optimal hole-size for polypipe to improve irrigation efficiency. Although each of those 
practices is considered best management practices, requiring prerequisite practices indicate that 
farmers get cost-share on practices that improve resource conservation over and above the 
minimum. Hence, using only those practices that received cost-share payments to determine 
additionality can result in underestimation of program impact because the prerequisite practice is 
also a requirement of a program but just without cost-share. Thus in some cases, those simple 
practices might or might not get adopted unless required as part of getting cost-share on more 
complex practices.  
Nevertheless, understanding how certain programs can affect the adoption of conservation can 
overcome the issue of presumed higher adoption resulting from conservation programs. In other 
words, several conservation programs that are introduced are implemented under a presumption 




consequently leading to environmental protection; however, not all programs might be perceived 
to provide such a benefit, thus minimizing overall adoption. Failure to account for what would 
have otherwise happened in the absence of the program can overestimate a programs’ impact, 
leading to either supporting a conservation program that is resulting in very little resource 
conservation or eliminating a program that is slow in implementation but can lead to higher 
conservation gains over the long-run. The study helps in identifying that conservation programs 
provide the much-needed conservation incentives for our farmers to be better stewards of the 
land and that funding to these existing programs is crucial in making farmers practice sustainable 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by the Full Sample, Farmers Enrolled and Not Enrolled Federal Cost-Share Program 
 
Variable 
 Full sample 
(n = 105) 
Enrolled 
(n = 55) 
Not Enrolled 
(n = 50) 




AGE = 1 if a farmer is more than 40 years; = 0 
otherwise 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39 
EDUCATION = 1 if a farmer has a bachelor’s degree or 
higher degree; = 0 otherwise 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.47 0.30 0.46 
INCOME 
 
= 1 if the annual gross farm revenue is more 
than USD 499,000; = 0 otherwise 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.49 
ATTITUDE = 1 if a farmer believed that farming practices 
affect water quality; = 0 otherwise 0.91 0.28 0.98 0.13 0.84 0.37 
FARMINGYEAR = 1 if the number of years in farming is more 
than 15 years; = 0 otherwise 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 
LAND_TENURE = 1 if owned majority of the land (more than 
50%); = 0 otherwise 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.50 
TECHNICAL_ASSIS =1 if a farmer obtained technical assistance 
from LSU AgCenter; =0 otherwise 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.50 
CROPACRES =1 if crops acre <= 500; =0 otherwise 0.49 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.36 0.48 
NORTH =1 if located in northwest and northeast 
geographic regions; =0 otherwise 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.30 0.46 
CENTRAL =1 if located in central geographic regions; =0 
otherwise 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.28 0.45 
SOUTH =1 if located in southwest and southeast 
geographic regions; =0 otherwise 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.32 0.47 
WATER_EP Water BMPs adopted 3.34 2.64 4.58 2.36 1.98 2.24 








Table 2. Summary of Producers Adopting Each of the BMPs 
Water management practices description 
Adopters Non-adopters 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1. Filter strips or buffers separating crop fields from 
drainage areas on your farm  
38 36.19 67 63.81 
2. Filter strips around mixing facilities  33 31.43 72 68.57 
3. Grassed waterways (vegetative ditches) 60 57.14 45 42.86 
4. Water-control structures (ex. pipes with riser) 60 57.14 45 42.86 
5. Hold winter water on your fields 31 29.52 74 70.48 
6. Use side inlet irrigation in rice production 11 10.48 94 89.52 
7. Tail water recovery system 5 4.76 100 95.24 
8. Capture and use surface water for irrigation 20 19.05 85 80.95 
9. Use computer programs to improve furrow 
irrigation efficiency 
21 20.00 84 80.00 
10. Prevent surface runoff from reaching the area 
immediately surrounding a water well 
39 37.14 66 62.86 
11. Utilize a closed or semi-closed mixing system 33 31.43 72 68.57 





Table 3. Estimated Coefficients from a Logit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
 
Dependent Variable, Enrolled Estimated Coefficient Standard 
Error 
AGE 0.14 0.74 
EDUCATION 0.08 0.51 
INCOME -0.26 0.53 
ATTITUDE 2.72** 1.12 
FARMINGYEAR -0.64 0.68 
LAND_TENURE -0.24* 0.53 
TECHNICAL_ASSIS 0.23 0.49 
CROPACRES 1.14*** 0.47 
NORTH 0.52* 0.94 
CENTRAL 0.21 0.93 
SOUTH -0.17 0.93 
Constant -2.91 1.37 
Log-likelihood -61.81  
Number of obs. 105  






Table 4. Propensity Score Matching Results: The Difference among Treated and Control 




 Enrolled  Not 
Enrolled 




10 Nearest-neighbor Matching (Caliper=0.05) 
WATER_EP Unmatched 4.582 1.980 2.602 5.77***   
 ATT 4.353 2.265 0.608 3.43*** 0.121 2.199 
Kernel Matching (Bandwidth=0.06) 
WATER_EP Unmatched 4.582 1.980 2.602 5.77***   
 ATT 4.423 3.185 1.238 2.16** 0.083 2.147 
**significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level 
 
 
